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BMW v. Roth, 127 Nev. Adv. No. 11 (April 14, 2011)1
Civil Procedure – Order for a New Trial
Summary
Consolidated appeals from the Eighth Judicial District Court order granting a new trial in a tort
action and from post-judgment orders regarding an award of attorney fees and costs.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court reversed both the District court’s judgment granting a new trial and the award of
attorney fees and costs because there was no contemporaneous objection when the asserted
instances of attorney misconduct occurred.
Factual and Procedural History
Alyson Roth (“Roth’) was involved in a single-car rollover accident. At the time of the
accident, Jennifer Stapleton (“Stapleton”) was driving Roth’s BMW while Roth slept in the front
seat. The car strayed off the side of the road, swerved back across the highway, and then rolled
into the desert before landing on its roof. Roth was ejected from the car and suffered a spinal
cord injury that rendered her paraplegic.
Roth sued Stapleton for negligence and BMW for strict product liability. Roth alleged
that although she was wearing her seatbelt, defects in BMW’s safety restraint system allowed her
to be thrown from the car. Roth’s experts testified that roof support between the car’s front and
rear side windows separated from the roof rail during the crash, causing Roth’s seatbelt to
become slack. BMW countered that Roth was not wearing her seatbelt and was ejected from the
passenger window before the vehicle began its second roll.
Prior to trial, Roth filed a motion in limine requesting that the court allow her to present
evidence she was wearing her seatbelt, and prohibit BMW from presenting evidence to the
contrary. Roth based her motion on Nevada’s Seatbelt Statute that prohibits a fact-finder from
considering evidence that a party was not wearing a seatbelt when determining causation or
negligence in a civil action.2 However, the district court found that in order for Roth to establish
the seatbelt was defective, she also had to prove that she was wearing the seatbelt at the time of
the collision. Thus, BMW was entitled to present evidence that Roth was not wearing her
seatbelt to defend itself against Roth’s crashworthiness claim. Before opening statements, the
district court gave the jury a limiting instruction, ordering it to only consider evidence suggesting
Roth was not wearing her seatbelt for the purpose of evaluating Roth’s claim that the subject
vehicle was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Throughout the trial, argued extensively on whether Roth was belted and how she was
thrown from the car. However, Roth did not object to BMW’s claims that she was not wearing
her seatbelt until BMW made the assertion during closing arguments. The district court
sustained the objection on the basis the comment was too broad and in violation of the order in
limine. The court then struck the statement and reread the limiting instruction. Roth again
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objected during closing arguments when BMW opined that Roth’s structural defect claims were
“red herrings” because Roth was not wearing her seatbelt. The court sustained the objection and
directed BMW to clarify its statement. BMW did so by emphasizing that the evidence showed
that Roth was not wearing her seatbelt so there was no proof that a defect in the seatbelt caused
Roth’s injuries.
The jury found that Stapleton was negligent in causing Roth’s injuries. The jury also
found, by answering special interrogatories, that the vehicle was not defective. Because the jury
found that the vehicle was not defective, they never reached the issue of causation.
Roth filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2), which allows the court
to grant a new trial if the prevailing party engaged in misconduct that materially affects the
substantial rights of the aggrieved party.3 The district court found that BMW intentionally,
repeatedly, consistently and persistently violated the order in limine during voir dire, opening
statements and closing arguments and therefore granted the motion for a new trial.
Discussion
Attorney Misconduct Under N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2)
Justice Pickering, writing for the Court sitting en banc, stated that an attorney’s violation
of an order in limine can amount to misconduct, sufficient to justify a new trial under NRCP
59(a)(2), if the standards of Lioce v. Cohen4 are met. The Court reviews attorney’s comments
for misconduct de novo. The three elements that must be satisfied for a new trial due to attorney
misconduct are that the order in limine must be specific in its prohibition, the violation must be
clear, and unfair prejudice affecting the reliability of the verdict must be shown.
The Court held that the standard a district court is to apply for a motion for a new trial
based on misconduct depends on whether or not the counsel objected to the misconduct during
trial.5 For objected-to misconduct, a party moving for a new trial bears the burden of
demonstrating that the conduct is so extreme that objection, admonishment and curative
instruction cannot remove its effect.6 If the misconduct is not objected to, the district court
should deem the issue waived unless it is plain error. Moreover, the court emphasized that usual
deference to the lower court’s findings was not owed if the lower court committed a legal error.
The Court examined each of the three instances of attorney misconduct that the district
court identified. First the Court examined the alleged misconduct during voir dire. During voir
dire, BMW stated that “plaintiff claims she was seatbelted [and] BMW claims that the physical
evidence shows that she was not wearing her seatbelt.” The district court admonished BMW’s
attorney to refrain from arguing the case. Roth pointed to this as an example of BMW’s
misconduct violating the motion in limine. The district court found that this was misconduct, but
the Supreme Court found this “clearly erroneous” because the order in limine allowed the
introduction of seatbelt evidence.
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The Court next examined the four instances during opening statements that the district
court found to be violations of the order in limine. Roth did not object at each instance and the
district court did not admonish BMW’s counsel sua sponte for making the comments.
Nevertheless, the district court viewed the instances as objected-to misconduct under Lioce,
because its order in limine and associated limiting instruction were definitive and clear.
Furthermore, the district held that Roth’s motion in limine constituted adequate objection to what
it found were BMW’s violations of the order.
The Court found the district court in error on both counts. The order was definitive in
permitting evidence to be introduced on Roth’s behalf, but not definitive or specific as to the
limitations imposed on the use of seatbelt evidence. Additionally, while Roth’s motion in limine
may have preserved her objection to the admission of the seatbelt evidence, that objection was
neither the basis for her appeal or the order granting it. A contemporaneous objection is required
to claim misconduct associated with an asserted violation of an order in limine.
Order in Limine does not Serve as a Continuing Objection
The Court next considered whether the Lioce requirement to object to a party’s violation
of an order in limine to preserve the error for a subsequent motion for a new trial was consistent
with Richmond v. State.8 Richmond held that once an objection had been fully briefed and the
district court decided on the motion, the motion in limine is preserved for appeal.9 Lioce, on the
other hand, generally held that, regardless of a motion in limine, unobjected-to attorney
misconduct is waived unless it constitutes plain error.10 However, the Court stated that whether
an order in limine preserves error depends on whether the alleged error violates the court’s
previous ruling on the motion. The Court concluded that an objection is required when an
opposing party or the court violates an order in limine.
Objections would have Clarified the Order in Limine
The Court next examined the conferences held before and during closing arguments as
examples of the confusion over the limitations that the order in limine placed on arguments. The
Court noted that the order in limine lacked specificity because the law regarding when seatbelt
evidence can be introduced in a crashworthiness case is unclear. Although, the Court did not
clarify the law regarding seatbelt evidence, it did note that objecting to BMW’s statements would
have prompted the district court to clarify what the order in limine actually allowed and
prohibited. The Court ultimately reaffirmed that a fully briefed and definitively ruled-on motion
in limine on an evidentiary question preserves error for challenges to whether the district court
properly ruled on the motion. However, the motion in limine itself does not serve as an objection
for violation of the order in limine, including attorney misconduct for that violation.
The Court reviewed the two objected-to statements during closing arguments. BMW’s
first objected to statement was that Roth was not wearing her seatbelt, so a defective seatbelt
could not have caused her injuries. The Court found that this statement did not violate the order
in limine and thus did not constitute misconduct. The second objected to comment that BMW
made was Roth’s defective seatbelt claims were “red herrings” because Roth was not wearing
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her seatbelt. At trial, Roth’s objection to this statement was sustained, and the jury was
instructed to disregard the statement. BMW clarified the statement, and Roth did not object to
the clarified statement. The court questioned whether this statement was indeed improper, but
because the admonition and instruction occurred so quickly, the court analyzed that statement as
involving objected-to and admonished misconduct under Lioce.12
In Lioce, the Court reasoned that when a party moves for a trial they must demonstrate
that the objected-to and admonished misconduct were so extreme that objection and misconduct
could not remove the misconduct’s effect.13 Here, the objected-to misconduct did not warrant a
new trial because the admonishment and instruction sufficiently cured the misconduct.
The Court reversed the order for a new trial and consequently reversed the award of
attorney fees and costs as well.
Conclusion
Three elements are required for a violation of an order in limine to constitute attorney
misconduct requiring a new trial under N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2). The order in limine must be specific,
the violation must be clear, and unfair prejudice must be shown. The standards of review set
forth in Lioce apply where a new trial is sought under N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2).
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